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To what youth whom you had ensnared by the allurements of your
seduction have you not furnished a weapon for his crimes or a torch
to kindle his lust?
-Marcus Tullius Cicero, 106 B.C.-43 B.C.'
Introduction
April 20, 1999, a recurring school scene: fifteen dead, bloody
kids, two teens accused of murder, and the question why. Students
packed the small cafeteria for their typical Tuesday lunch, milk, and
gossip. Soon thereafter, two boys, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris,
entered Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, and
unleashed their evil upon the unsuspecting teenagers. Moments later,
thirteen students and one teacher lay dead while twenty-three others
were horribly wounded. Their shooting rampage also claimed their
own lives, as they turned the guns on themselves. On a home video
found after the slayings, Dylan Klebold emphatically stated his grisly
intentions: "I hope we kill 250 of you." Eric Harris ensures that
* B.A., Yale University, 1994; J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, 2001. I am especially grateful for the comments and encouragement
of Katherine Kiernan and Patrick McKinney III. I am also indebted to Mark Fumia,
Susan Mishkin, and Iver Larson. The opinions expressed and any resulting errors are
those of the author.
1. Marcus Tullius Cicero, First Oration Against Catiline, in THE PORTABLE ROMAN
READER 228,234 (Basil Davenport ed., Penguin Books 1979).
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there is no mistake: The massacre is going to be "like f__ing Doom"
and their "shotgun is straight out of Doom! " 2
In the aftermath of the perverse pattern of horrifying schoolyard
shootings, the video game industry has attracted significant attention
for manufacturing and distributing violent video games to minors.3 In
fact, Congress and some state legislatures have proposed rating games
or prohibiting the distribution of violent video games to minors.4 In
addition, eight days before the Columbine massacre, the parents of
Jessica James, Kayce Steger, and Nicole Hadley filed a $180 million
lawsuit against Sega of America Inc., id Software, and other video
game manufacturers for negligently manufacturing and distributing
eleven violent video games to Michael Carneal, the fourteen-year-old
freshman who opened fire with a .22 caliber pistol on a student prayer
circle.5  The games included "Quake," "Doom," and "Mortal
Kombat." The plaintiffs alleged that the video games "'made the
violence pleasurable and attractive, and disconnected the violence
from the natural consequences thereof, thereby causing Michael
Carneal to act out the violence."' 6 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that
the games "'trained Carneal how to point and shoot a gun in a fashion
making him an extraordinary killer without teaching him any of the
constraints or responsibilities needed to inhibit such a killing
capacity."' 7 This lawsuit is believed to be the first filed against a
video game manufacturer for allegedly manufacturing a game that
caused the player to injure a third party.8
However, this is not the first case against a media defendant
alleging that the defendant's media works caused a person to injure
2. Nancy Gibbs et al., Special Report: The Columbine Tapes, TIME MAG., Dec. 20,
1999, at 40, available at 1999 WL 29489220.
3. See Trent C. Ward, Videogames and Youth Violence: A Closer Look at What's
Really at Risk and What You Can Do to Help (April 28, 1999), at http://pc.ign.com/
news/7864.html; Game Makers Refuse Blame for Shootings, REUTERS, May 14, 1999.
available at http://technews.netscape.com-342489.html?tag=st.ne.1005-200-344150 (on file
with author).
4. See Jessica Hall, Sex, Violence and Video Games, THE DAILY REC., Dec. 10, 1993.
available at 1993 WL 2990140.
5. 1999 Year in Review: Video Game Violence Back in the Spotlight, 6 MULTIMEDIA
WIRE, Dec. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6703643; Scott Whittier, The Recent School
Shootings: Are Video Game Manufacturers Liable?, 222 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1999, at 1, col.
1. The Carneal lawsuit was filed as James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D.
Ky. 2000). See Whittier, supra, at 1.
6. Shooting Death Claims Against Internet, Video, Motion Picture Defendants Are
Dismissed, 5 INTERNET NEWSL.: LEGAL AND BUS. ASPECTS, at 4, (May 2000), available
at Westlaw, 5 No. 2 INEWSLBA 4.
7. Id.
8. See Whittier, supra note 5, at 1.
[Vol. 52
the plaintiff.9 The courts have typically barred recovery in those
cases, on the grounds that the expression conveyed by the music,
literature, or movies did not fall within one of the traditionally
excepted categories of speech: fighting words, obscenity, commercial
speech, or child pornography. Moreover, most of these courts,
applying the Brandenburg incitement test,10 held that the media
works at issue did not direct the incitement of imminent lawless
activity, and thus constituted a protected form of speech. This raises
questions whether the video game manufacturers can be held liable
for the deaths or injuries of the students and teachers in Littleton or
Paducah under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.
The First Amendment implications arising from imposing
liability on video game manufacturers is an important issue to video
game manufacturers who intend to create and distribute violent video
games; to legislatures who want to curb juvenile violence and who are
searching for answers to mollify enraged and scared parents; to First
Amendment scholars who might see a dangerous opportunity for
legislatures and courts to infringe on First Amendment rights, as both
institutions search for a culprit or a scapegoat for the recent pattern
of schoolyard killings; and finally, to the parents who struggle to
comprehend the violence. This dialogue takes on new urgency
following the recently published FTC report, Marketing Violent
Entertainment to Children: A Review of Self-Regulation and Industry
Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game
Industries." In that report, the FTC found that of the 118 games with
a Mature rating for violence, 70% targeted children under 17.12 First
Amendment scholars have offered little input on the problems raised
by violent video games, and aside from a few student notes and a
short article 13 on the topic, little dialogue addresses the issue.
9. See Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992);
Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979); McCollum v. CBS,
Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988); Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal.
1975); Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989); Yakubowicz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
10. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
11. FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF
SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC
RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES (2000) [hereinafter FTC REPORT],
available at http:llwww.ftc.govopa/2000/091
youthviol.htm.
12. Id. at iv; see also id. at 36-51.
13. Whittier, supra note 5.
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This Note explores the ostensibly insurmountable First
Amendment barrier facing a plaintiff, injured by a minor who was
allegedly induced by a violent video game to commit a violent act, in
bringing a suit against the video game industry. For the purposes of
this analysis, it will be assumed that the plaintiff has proven all the
elements of tort including actual and proximate causation. Part I
argues that violent video games are a form of expression entitled to
some level of First Amendment protection. Part II discusses the
likelihood of a plaintiff succeeding in bringing a negligence action
against a video game manufacturer for producing and distributing
violent video games that allegedly caused foreseeable harm to third
parties under current First Amendment jurisprudence. First, this Part
surveys the relevant Supreme Court First Amendment case law.
Second, the lower court decisions applying Supreme Court precedent
are discussed, as well as the relevant limitations they pose to potential
plaintiffs. Finally, this Part discusses other lower courts that have
abandoned the strictures of Brandenburg. Part III argues that the
lower courts have erroneously applied the Brandenburg incitement
test in cases involving a media defendant and proposes a new
standard that should apply in the video game manufacturer tort
liability context, one that will allow a plaintiff to proceed on its tort
claims.
I. Video Games Are Entitled to Limited First Amendment
Protection
The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... ,14
Comparing the First Amendment to other Amendments in the Bill of
Rights, it is one of the few stated in absolute terms.15 However, the
Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment as
providing absolute protection to all forms of speech or expression.
For example, the First Amendment does not provide protection to
the following four categories of speech: obscenity, 6 child
pornography, 17 fighting words, 18 and speech that directs the
incitement of imminent unlawful activity and is likely to result in that
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII.
16. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
18. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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activity.19 Furthermore, commercial speech2° and nude dancing2'
have been extended only marginal protection. In addition, although
the media-meaning the press, the broadcast media, and other
commercial disseminators of information-have First Amendment
rights to communicate information and ideas to the public, not all
forms of media are provided commensurate protection. The
broadcast media, for example, receives only the most limited
protection because of the scarcity of bandwidths,22 its established
pervasiveness in American lives, and its accessibility to children.23
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment protects "[e]ntertainment, as well as political and
ideological speech."24 Thus, motion pictures,25 programs broadcast by
radio and television,26 live entertainment,27 musical28 and dramatic
works,29 music,30 and non-verbal entertainment such as live nude
dancing3' fall within the Constitutional umbrella of protection. Even
with this abundance of case law, the Supreme Court has not
articulated constitutional standards that courts can use to ascertain
when expression falls within the protected category of
entertainment.32
19. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
20. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579-81
(1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (recognizing "the
common sense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech."); see also Jefferey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L.
REv. 297,317-19 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny).
21. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
22 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
23. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-51 (1978).
24. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (striking down a local zoning
ordinance that prohibited all "live entertainment" on the grounds that the state failed to
show that live entertainment presented sufficient problems to justify regulation).
25. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (stating that motion
pictures are a significant medium of expression and function as an organ of public
opinion).
26. See Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 367 (stating that the First Amendment
protects electronic media, albeit limited).
27. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 61.
28. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
29. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) ("An actor, like everyone else
in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right
openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic performance.").
30. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
31. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
32. See Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 472 A.2d 809, 810 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983) (stating that the Supreme Court has not articulated any precise test for determining
the level of protection afforded to entertainment, and, in particular, video games). Note,
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A. Lower Courts' Application of the First Amendment to Video Games
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to prescribe constitutional
norms defining the "entertainment" category of speech, federal and
state courts have almost uniformly held that for entertainment to be
entitled to protected status, it must be designed to communicate or
express some idea or information.33 Finding that video games fail to
communicate ideas or information and are designed principally for
recreational purposes, these courts have concluded that video games
do not fall within the "entertainment" category.34 The seminal case
involving video games is the federal district court case America's Best
Family Showplace Corp. v. The City of New York,35 where the
Department of Buildings of the City of New York denied the plaintiff
permission to install more than the four video game limit imposed by
the city code.36 In response, the plaintiff brought an action in federal
district court contending that video games were a protected form of
speech and that the city code, therefore, unconstitutionally restricted
his First Amendment right to display video games.37
First, the court interpreted the Supreme Court's entertainment
jurisprudence as requiring a showing of a communicative or
informative element in order to be entitled to protection.38
According to the court, video games are not designed to inform and,
although video games may be copyrighted, "they 'contain so little in
the way of particularized form of expression' that video games cannot
however, that the court disingenuously argues that in order for entertainment to be
afforded protection it must be designed to communicate or inform. See id. After stating
this "test," the court contends that the Supreme Court has not articulated a test.
33. See, e.g., id.; Caswell v. Licensing Comm. for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 925 (Mass.
1983).
34. See Malden Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.
Mass. 1983); America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp.
170, 173-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Kaye, 472 A.2d at 810; Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 925;
Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 609-10 (Mass.
1983); People v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); City of St. Louis
v. Kiely, 652 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. City of New
York, 459 N.Y.S.2d 220, 226-27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); City of New York v. Rambling Ram
Realty Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 29, 1982, at p.6, col.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
35. 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
36. See id. at 171.
37. See id. at 173.
38. See id. (stating that "before entertainment is accorded First Amendment
protection there must be some element of information or some idea being
communicated").
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be fairly characterized as a form of speech. '39 Furthermore, the
plaintiff's arguments that video games are like motion pictures was
summarily rejected, for video games are no different from pinball,
chess, and baseball: games that constitute "pure entertainment with
no informational element."40 Finally, the mere fact that video games
talked to the participant, played music, or had written instructions did
not render the game informational.41 The court also distinguished the
case from Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson 42 where the Supreme Court
extended First Amendment protection to motion pictures, stating, "In
no sense can it be said that video games are meant to inform....
Accordingly, there is no need to draw that 'elusive' line 'between the
informing and the entertaining.' ''43
Other federal and state courts have likewise ruled that video
games are not protected forms of expression.44 These courts similarly
ruled that because video games lack an informational or
communicative element, they are unprotected. For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Caswell held that video games are
not cognizable speech or expression because (1) any communication
or information disseminated while playing a video game is
inconsequential and (2) video games are merely technologically
advanced games of pinball or chess, and that technological
advancement alone does not entitle First Amendment status to an
otherwise unprotected game.45 The court also rejected plaintiff's
arguments that video games are sufficiently analogous to motion
pictures in that they represent the video game designer's expression
of an idea or fantasy and that this idea is transmitted to its audience
via audio and visual effects. 46
Admittedly, some lower courts have rejected the rationale and
holding of America's Best and its progeny. These cases provide
39. Id. at 174 (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982)




42. 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (extending First Amendment protection to motion pictures).
43. America's Best Family Showplace Corp., 536 F. Supp. at 174. The Supreme Court
recognized the "elusive line" in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), where the court
argued that the line between entertaining and informing was too "elusive" for the court to
ascertain. Accordingly, the court extended First Amendment protection to magazines of
bloodlust and crime, even though the court conceded that it found no value in the
magazines. See iL, at 510.
44. See supra note 33.
45. See Caswell v. Licensing Comm. For Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983).
46. See id at 926.
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dubious precedent, for they have either stated conclusively that since
nude dancing is protected, video games are surely protected, 47 or they
analogize video games to motion pictures and contend that video
games are sufficiently similar without providing a scintilla of
analysis. 48
B. Video Games Should Be Afforded Constitutional Protection
In direct contrast with the America's Best line of cases, Senior
District Judge Johnstone in the Michael Carneal case49 indicated that
the First Amendment prevents the parents of the three teenage girls
killed in the school shooting from holding the manufacturers of the
violent video games liable, although in dicta. The lawsuit arose out of
the events that transpired on December 1, 1997, when Michael
Carneal fired upon a school prayer group, killing three teenage girls.50
After dismissing the plaintiff's tort claims on Kentucky common law
grounds-finding no duty or proximate causation-Judge Johnstone
stated that "it is clear that this case raises various constitutional
concerns."51 Although the court noted that it was precluded from
reaching the "constitutional concerns" because "'constitutional
questions should be decided only where necessary,"' 52 it nevertheless
unabashedly explained that had it reached this question the following
principles would apply:
The theories of liability sought to be imposed upon the
manufacturer of a [violent video game] ... would have a
devastatingly broad chilling effect on expression of all forms. It
cannot be justified by the benefit Plaintiff claims would result from
the imposition. The libraries of the world are a great reservoir of
works of fiction and nonfiction which may stir their readers to
commit heinous acts of violence or evil. However, ideas expressed
in one work which may drive some people to violence or ruin, may
inspire others to feats of excellence or greatness. As was stated by
47. See Gameways, Inc. v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J., May 27, 1982, at 6, col. I (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982) (stating that since "other forms of expression no more 'informative' than video
games-viewing nude dancing through a coin operated mechanism-have been
recognized as constitutionally protected ... video games are a form of speech protected by
the First Amendment.").
48. See Oltmann v. Palos Hills, No. 82-3568, slip op. at 13-14 (Ill. Cir. Ct. August 20,
1982) (stating that since video games are similar to motion pictures, they are afforded
protection), cited in Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 926, and in Kaye Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
472 A.2d 809, 811 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983).
49. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
50. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text for description of the facts and
allegations against the video game manufacturers.
51. James, 90 F. Supp. at 818.
52. Id. (quoting Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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the second Mr. Justice Harlan, 'one man's vulgarity is another
man's lyric.' Atrocities have been committed in the name of many
of civilization's great religions, intellectuals, and artists, yet the first
amendment does not hold those whose ideas inspired the crimes to
answer for such acts. To do so would be to allow the freaks and
misfits of society to declare what the rest of the country can and
cannot read, watch and hear.53
In fact, Judge Johnstone explained that the specter of the First
Amendment further obligates the court to reject the plaintiff's
argument that the video game manufacturers have a legal duty owed
to the plaintiffs. Thus, Judge Johnstone made it emphatically clear
that video game manufacturers were entitled to absolute First
Amendment protection in manufacturing and distributing violent
video games.
The dicta in James is unremarkable for Senior District Judge
Johnstone also decided Watters v. TSR, Inc.,54 the famous Dungeons
and Dragons (D&D) case. In Watters, a mother brought a wrongful
death action against TSR, the manufacturer of D&D-a role-playing
fantasy game-alleging that the game caused her son to commit
suicide.55 The plaintiff argued that TSR was negligent in failing to
warn "mentally fragile" persons of the potential dangerous
consequences of playing D&D.56 After listing quotations from
Supreme Court opinions, Judge Johnstone held that whether D&D
be characterized as literature or merely as a game, it nonetheless falls
within the category of publication afforded First Amendment
protection.57 However, no analysis was provided as to why D&D fell
within this category or whether a communicative element was
required; rather, the court conclusively stated that it was irrelevant
whether D&D was designed to inform or merely entertain.58 This
analysis is what makes both James and Watters most damaging for
plaintiffs, for the Court takes an absolutist stance towards the First
Amendment and establishes precedence that "mere games" that are
solely designed to entertain are not only a protected form of
expression but are entitled to the same level of protection as political
speech.
53. Id. at 818-19.
54. 715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky. 1989), affd on other grounds, 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1990).
55. See icL at 820.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 821; see also Hammerhead Enters., Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 34-36
(2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a game satirizing public assistance programs was a protected
form of speech).
58. See Watters, 715 F. Supp. at 821.
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In a subsequent case against a video game manufacturer, a court
is likely to reject the American Best line of cases in favor of James and
Watters, at least as to the issue of whether video games are a
cognizable form of expression under the First Amendment. First,
while intuitively it is plausible that the Supreme Court would require
a showing that the entertainment in question was designed to
communicate some idea or information, the Court has never explicitly
stated such a requirement. In fact, the Court intimated, in Winters v.
New York, 59 that it may be impossible to determine mere
entertainment from entertainment that is designed to communicate or
inform: "The line between the informing and the entertaining is too
elusive for the protection" of the basic right of expression, for
"[e]veryone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction."
More surprisingly, the Court stated that although it could find no
value to society in magazines that were devoted to criminal news and
stories of bloodshed, they were as entitled to First Amendment
protection as the best of literature.60 As Justice Reed so eloquently
stated: "What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. '61
The America's Best line of cases directly conflicts with this principle.
Under the America's Best reasoning, a court would act essentially as a
review board, or more likely a censorship board, and decide whether
a particular piece of fiction was propaganda or mere entertainment.
Winters, however, precludes a court from serving such a function.
Moreover, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,62 the Court extended
First Amendment protection to live nude dancing without a showing
that the dance was designed to communicate ideas or to inform the
audience. It merely stated that in previous decisions nude dancing
had been recognized as expressive conduct. Finally, and more
damaging to a plaintiff bringing suit against a video game
manufacturer, is the Supreme Court's extension of First Amendment
protection to motion pictures.63 The Court explained that motion
pictures are a "significant medium for the communication of ideas." 64
They affect public attitudes and behavior by directly communicating
political or social doctrine, or by the "subtle shaping of thought which
59. 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790
(1989) (holding that music was a protected form of expression under the First Amendment
and reasoning that music has a capacity to appeal to the "intellect and to the emotions").
63. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
64. Id. at 501.
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characterizes all artistic expression." 65 Moreover, the significance of
motion pictures as "an organ of public opinion" is not made any less
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as inform.66 For
further support, the Court then quoted the Winter's "elusive line"
statement, and stated that the mere fact that motion pictures are
produced, distributed, and exhibited for a profit is irrelevant for First
Amendment purposes.67 According to the Court, the basic principles
of the First Amendment make freedom of expression the rule, and no
reasons were present to abdicate that rule.68
Reading the three cases together provides broad protection to all
forms of entertainment. In light of the Court's statements that
freedom of expression is the rule, that it is not willing to demarcate
the elusive line between entertaining and informing, and the Court's
perfunctory analysis in Barnes and Ward, there is a strong
presumption that video games are a protected form of entertainment,
unless reasons are present that justify not extending protection. Note,
however, that the Supreme Court did not articulate nor even allude to
what possible reasons could exist to justify not extending protection.
The Court's statement regarding justifications appears to be surplus
language; therefore, a proper reading of the Court's entertainment
jurisprudence is that any form of entertainment, whether it be a
novel, painting, motion picture, or video game, is protected, because a
court should not act as a censorship or review board. Hence,
although a court may not find any social value in a video game, the
First Amendment provides some level of protection. Finally, the
Supreme Court has never explicitly stated, as it did in United States v.
O'Brien69 and Texas v. Johnson,70 that a particularized message must
be apparent in order to extend First Amendment protection to the
speech at issue. On the contrary, it appears that the Court was stating
just the opposite, that no particular message is required when dealing
with art and entertainment.
Second, America's Best and its progeny, aside from the
perfunctory analysis in Caswell, also ignored the artistic expression
that can be embodied in video games. Recently, in fact, the Seventh
65. Id
66. Id.
67. See id. at 501-02.
68. See id. at 503. Note that the court fails to explain this naked assertion; thus, it is
unclear what "reasons" the court was contemplating.
69. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (stating the test to determine whether conduct is sufficiently
expressive to be entitled First Amendment protection).
70. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning).
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Circuit court of Appeals, in Rothner v. City of Chicago, recognized
the myopic holdings of those decisions and stated that it could not
hold that all video games were per se unprotected. 71 The court
explained that some games may be "more sophisticated presentations
involving storyline and plot that convey to the user a significant
artistic message," and that they may be considered works of art.72
The court emphatically stated that a contrary conclusion would
probably be at odds with reality.73 However, even the Rothner court
focused too much upon the communication of ideas rather than upon
the artistic expression embodied in video games. The production of
video games involves a complex, creative process, where the video
game designer chooses the storyline, plot, audio background, and the
animation to express his ideas on the screen.74 The video game,
therefore, represents the video game designer's expression of ideas
and fantasy transmitted to its audience via technologically
sophisticated electronic audio and visual display, just as the canvas
provides the medium of expression for the painter's ideas and fantasy,
and the motion picture represents the screenwriter's expression of
ideas and fantasy. It would be a bitter pill to swallow that First
Amendment protection depends solely upon the medium an artist
chooses. Imagine if the Court were to hold that a Jackson Pollok
painting is protected if on canvas but not on notebook paper because
the latter is not sufficiently expressive.
Moreover, America's Best and its progeny were decided during
the embryonic stages of video game development, when "PacMan,"
"Donkey Kong," and "Asteroids" were at issue.75 The Video games
of today are far more sophisticated than the games of the early 1980's.
Designers today rely on full-motion video, detailed animation, and
stereo surround sound to bring their storyline, plots, and characters to
life. Today's games are able to simulate real-world environments in
games like "Postal" or "Kingpin," and vivid fantasy worlds in games
like "Doom II," "Time Splitters," and "Mortal Kombat IV."
Third, the function that video games serve in promoting First
Amendment principles was never broached by those cases. Rather,
America's Best and its progeny applied Supreme Court precedent
71. See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991).
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See John E. Sullivan, Note, First Amendment Protection of Artistic Entertainment:
Toward Reasonable Municipal Regulation of Video Games, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1223, 1262-
65 (1983), for a comprehensive discussion of the artistic value of video games.
75. See Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983).
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formalistically without any analysis as to the social value of video
games. For example, video games arguably shape and develop the
electorate who will one day be called upon to vote, by the "subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.
76
Since the voter derives his knowledge and intelligence from the full
range of human communications in all forms,.77 video games like other
forms of entertainment-novels, motion pictures, dramas, dance-
should be protected in the interest of promoting self-governance
8
Moreover, the public has a First Amendment right to receive this
information and experience. 79 Thus, not recognizing video games as a
form of protected entertainment deprives citizens access to aesthetic,
political, social, moral, and other ideas and experiences that are or
may be intertwined with the video game. Furthermore, because of
the pervasiveness of video games in American lives,80 video games,
like motion pictures, serve as a "significant medium" of
communication of diverse ideas and experiences that shape and affect
public attitudes.
In addition, freedom of expression is essential to the promotion
of self-fulfillment and autonomy by protecting and encouraging the
exercise of the creative capacities "central to human rationality."
'81
Thus, protecting video games fosters and protects the personal
autonomy and self-fulfillment interest of the video game designers
who painstakingly exercise their creative capacities in developing
storylines, plots, characters, and rich animation. Furthermore, some
commentators have argued that the First Amendment serves as a
76. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,501 (1952).
77. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245,256,263 (1961).
78. See id.; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 15-16, 24-27,39 (1948).
79. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that citizens
have a First Amendment right to receive and have suitable access to "political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences").
80. See generally LT. COL. DAVE GROSSMAN & GLORIA DEGAETANO, STOP
TEACHING OUR KIDS TO KILL: A CALL TO ACTION AGAINST TV, MOVIE & VIDEO
GAME VIOLENCE 65-66 (1999) (discussing the pervasiveness of video games and stating
that video game sales in the U.S. exceed 10 billion dollars); Deborah Shapely, High Tech
High Touch, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2278873 (reviewing
JOHN NAIsBITT, TECHNOLOGY AND OUR SEARCH FOR MEANING (2000) (stating that
there are twenty-seven million casual gainers in the country)); 1999 Year in Review: Video
Game Violence Back in the Spotlight, MULTIMEDIA WIRE, Dec. 22, 1999, available at 1999
WL 6703643 (stating that the gaming industry is closing in on the 7 billion dollar mark);.
81. David AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45,62 (1974).
November 2000] VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
checking valve against social unrest and revolution. 82 The rationale is
that the suppression of ideas and communication encourages citizens
to substitute force for rational judgment; therefore, freedom of
expression is essential for a society to maintain stability and ordered
liberty.83 A video game by its very nature can be quintessentially a
public safety valve: it can provide an arena for citizens to vent
frustration, illegal desires, and other undesirable behavior in a
fictional, controlled, safe environment. Admittedly, the application
of this rationale is a bit tenuous here, because generally when we
think of the First Amendment as a safety valve, we think of the
speaker, not the receiver of the information-for it is the speaker that
uses a pen rather than the sword. Here, however, the video game
provides a safety-valve for the receiver of the information. The
distinction, however, is irrelevant, for the social benefit that the video
game provides as a safety-valve for political and social unrest is just as
compelling.
In sum, notwithstanding the lower court decisions following
America's Best, a plaintiff more likely than not will fail in an attempt
to argue that the First Amendment does not protect video games.
While at first blush, it would appear that video games are mere
entertainment and thus should not be afforded protection, upon
further examination, one uncovers the First Amendment values video
games promote. Moreover, after cases like James and Watters, the
word "game" is no longer a talisman for unprotected speech. The
author will assume for the remainder of this Note that video games
are a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. The
next section will discuss the likelihood of a state permitting a plaintiff
to recover civil damages as a result of suffering physical injury
because the violent video game incited or induced a minor to inflict
the physical injury.
II. First Amendment Limitations on the Imposition of Civil
Damages
The liberty of speech and the press falls within the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from invasion of state action.84  Compensating a plaintiff and
imposing civil damages in a court of law is sufficient state action to
82. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
83. See id.
84. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
[Vol. 52
implicate the strictures of the First Amendment.85 Consequently, the
First Amendment generally bars tort claims for injuries caused by
speech.86 The Supreme Court has reasoned that imposing civil
damages under a state law may be "markedly more inhibiting than
the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute," and therefore may
have more of a self-censoring effect on expression.87
Therefore, in order to avoid a video game manufacturer's First
Amendment defense, the plaintiff must show that violent video games
fall within one of the excepted categories of unprotected speech or
must provide some other rationale for imposing civil liability. Four
categories of speech fall outside of First Amendment protection: (1)
fighting words,88 (2) obscenity,89 (3) child pornography,90 and (4)
directed incitement of imminent lawless activity that is likely to result
in that activity.91 In addition, the Constitution provides only limited
protection to defamatory speech,92 and commercial speech.93 Clearly
violent video games do not fall within the commercial speech,94
defamatory speech,95 or child pornography96 categories.
85. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("Although this is a civil
lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law ....
The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.").
86. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (holding that the constitution limits a states
power to award civil damages in a libel action: the constitution requires that a public
official seeking civil damages for defamatory falsehood show actual malice); see also
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972) (stating that the "constitution guarantees
of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within
'narrowly limited classes of speech"'); cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(permitting the imposition of civil liability in a defamation case where the injured plaintiff
was a private citizen); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (plurality) (holding that false statements in a credit report did not constitute a
matter of "public concern" and therefore the constitution did not require a showing of
actual malice).
87. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 277 ("What a State may not constitutionally bring about by
means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.").
88. See generally, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
89. See generally, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
90. See generally, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
91. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (per curiam).
92. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
93. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
94. At least one commentator has argued that video games located in an arcade that
require tokens to play are a form of commercial speech because their purpose is to urge a
transaction on behalf of the arcade. See Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Trouble in Outer
Galactica: The Police Power, Zoning, and Coin-operated Videogames, 34 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 453, 502 (1983). Under this view, however, all forms of entertainment that required
payment and principally served a recreational function would be considered commercial
November 2000] VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
A.Violent Video Games Are Not Obscene: The Miller Barrier
In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set forth the current
test for obscenity:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.97
No violent video game that is currently on the market is likely to
fit into the court's obscenity doctrine: As apparent from the court's
definition of obscenity, to fall within this category of speech, the
content of the violent video games would have to include "patently
offensive" sexual conduct appealing to the prurient interest.98 In fact,
in Cohen v. California,99 the Court stated that in order to be
considered obscene the "expression must be, in some significant way,
erotic."
Admittedly, some commentators have argued that the obscenity
doctrine should be expanded to also include ultra violent content.100
These commentators argue that violence is "at least as obscene as sex.
If sexual images may go sufficiently beyond community standards for
candor and offensiveness, and hence be unprotected, there is no
reason why the same should not be true of violence."101 Accordingly,
the Miller test needs only minor changes: replacing the phrase
"appeals to the prurient interest" to "appeals to the prurient or
morbid interest," and including "sexual or violent conduct" within the
second prong of the test.102 The third element would remain the
speech. To the extent that this is true, which seems to be an unwarranted extension of the
commercial speech doctrine and the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp..
447 U.S. 557 (1980), this Note restricts its analysis to games played on consoles or on a
personal computer.
95. Defamatory language constitutes false statements of fact. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at
339-40.
96. Child pornography refers to sexual performances by children. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
97. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971) (holding that the words "Fuck the Draft" were not
obscene under Miller).
100. See KEVIN SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY 3 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Kevin Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First
Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 107, 173-75 (1994).
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same. 0 3 Consistent with this view, Missouri passed legislation that
restricted a minor's access to violent materials.1 4 The Missouri
statute essentially tracts the three-pronged Miller test.10 5 The Eighth
Circuit court of Appeals, however, struck down the statute as
unconstitutional. 106 The court explained that obscenity encompasses
expression that depicts sexual conduct, but not violence without
depictions of sexual conduct. 10 7 In light of Video Software Dealers
Ass'n and the Supreme Court's limitations on the doctrine recognized
in Cohen, it is unlikely that a court would be willing to extend the
doctrine to include violent video games, especially without legislation
that defines obscene violence.
B. Violent Video Games Do Not Constitute Fighting Words: The
Chaplinsky Barrier
In addition, the content in violent video games is not likely to be
considered "fighting words." The Supreme Court first discussed
"fighting words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire0 8 Mr. Chaplinsky
was convicted for breach of peace for calling a City Marshall of
Rochester a "God damned racketeer and a damned fascist."'1 9 The
Court upheld the statute that prohibited a person from addressing
another by "any offensive, derisive, or annoying word."" 0 The Court
then stated the often quoted dicta: "fighting words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace- are not constitutionally protected because their
slight social value as a step to truth... is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.""' Violent video games,
however, do not involve the face-to-face confrontation where epithets
are hurled, which are likely to provoke an average person to retaliate
and thus cause a breach of peace. Moreover, the "fighting words"
doctrine is, itself, a questionable doctrine. The Supreme Court has
not upheld a statute based upon the doctrine since Chaplinsky.
103. See id
104. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 573.090 (Supp. 1992). Other statutes also restrict violent
materials from minors. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-601 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-17-901 to 39-17-914 (1991).
105. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 573.090.
106. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 687-91 (8th Cir. 1992).
107. See iL at 688.
108. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
109. See id. at 569.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 572.
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Moreover, a slight majority of the court in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,112 held
that some fighting words could not be proscribed with content based
legislation.
C. Video Games Unlikely to Direct the Incitement of Imminent Unlawful
Activity: The Brandenburg and Progeny Barrier
(1) Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Hess v.
Indiana
Most plaintiffs that have brought actions against media
defendants have alleged that the media works incited unlawful
activity.1 13 The modern doctrine for criminalizing incitement of
unlawful activity was promulgated by the Supreme Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.114 The state had convicted Mr. Brandenburg, a
leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, under the Ohio criminal syndicalism
statute that prohibited "'advocat(ing) ... the duty, necessity, or
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform."'115 Mr. Brandenburg was convicted under the statute for
holding a Klan rally, which was filmed by an invited news crew.116
The film showed twelve hooded individuals, some carrying firearms,
who were gathered around a large, burning wooden cross.1 7 Mr.
Brandenburg, in full Klan regalia, made a speech to the participants
which, in addition to derogatory remarks about African-Americans
and people of Jewish descent, included the statement: "We're not a
112. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A.V., the justices were split over the application of the
doctrine. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that while the fighting words are
unprotected, a state may not proscribe fighting words based upon their protected message.
Thus, "fighting words" is no longer a talisman for unprotected expression.
113. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987); Zamora
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 206 (S.D. Fla. 1979); McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988); Bill v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 187 Cal. Rptr.
625 (Ct. App. 1982); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981);
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071-72 (Mass. 1989);
DeFilippo v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 446 A.2d 1036, 1040 (R.I. 1982). However, some
lower courts have applied different standards. But see Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, 968 F.2d 1110, 1116-20 (11th Cir. 1992) (negligence standard), Weirum v. RKO
Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 172 (Cal. 1975) (negligence standard), and Walt Disney Prods.,
Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ga. 1981) (Clear and present danger test), for cases
using alternative standards in lieu of Brandenburg's incitement test. These latter cases are
discussed infra Part C(2).
114. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 444-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Anderson 1968)).
116. See id. at 445.
117. See id.
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revengeant organization, but if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.' '1 8
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction." 9 After discussing
Whitney v. California,120 the Court held that the "constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.' 2' The Court explained that the "'mere abstract teaching...
of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action
and steeling it to such action.""122  Thus, a statute that fails to
distinguish between "mere advocacy" and incitement to imminent
lawless action does not pass constitutional muster.123 The Court held
that the criminal syndicalism statute was unconstitutional because it
punished "mere advocacy" of the use of violence to achieve political
reform, and for assembling with a group to advocate such action.124
The Supreme Court, therefore, forged a new bright-line rule to
judge speech that advocates the use of violence and unlawful conduct
to accomplish social and political ends. More important, the Court
appeared to reject the "clear and present danger" balancing test, with
which the Court had a long and tortured experience since 1919,125
with the case of Schenck v. United States.126 In fact, Justices Black and
Douglas in their concurring opinions explicitly stated that the "clear
and present danger" test had no place in constitutional
jurisprudence.127 Finally, the Court has left open the question as to
whether the outcome would have been different had violence actually
followed the speech.128
118. Id at 446.
119. See id. at 447-49.
120. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
121. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
122- 1& at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,297-98 (1961)).
123. See id. at 449.
124. See id. at 448-49.
125. See id. at 450-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the court's trouble applying
the "clear and present danger test").
126. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
127. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449-57 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., concurring).
128. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (recognizing
that a "substantial question would be presented whether [the defendant] could be held
liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct" if acts of violence had followed the
defendant's speech even if the speech did not rise to the level required by Brandenburg).
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Hess v. Indiana29 was the first application of the Brandenburg
test by the Supreme Court. This case, although not as widely quoted
as Brandenburg, may provide a more formidable hurdle for plaintiffs
bringing tort actions against video game manufacturers, because the
Court takes a literal and formalistic approach in applying the
Brandenburg test. Mr. Hess was convicted under a disorderly
conduct statute 30 for shouting "we'll taking the fucking street later
(or again)" during an antiwar demonstration. 131 First, the Court
stated that the First Amendment prohibits the "'States to punish the
use of words or language not within 'narrowly limited classes of
speech."' 132  After the Cohen v. California133 decision, Mr. Hess's
words clearly did not constitute obscenity. Furthermore, his words
were not "fighting words" because they were "not directed by any
person or group in particular," and a police officer at the scene did
not interpret the words as a personal attack.134 The Court also held
that the statement could not be considered a public nuisance because
substantial privacy interests had not been invaded. 35
More importantly, the statements did not meet a strict
application of Brandenburg. The Court stated that the remarks, at
best, "could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some
indefinite future time," and that this was insufficient to permit the
state to punish Mr. Hess. 3 6 The Court explained that since Hess'
statements were not directed to any person or group of persons, it did
not constitute advocacy. The Court's finding is quite remarkable
when one considers the context of Hess' speech. Hess made his
statement during an antiwar demonstration while police were
129. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
130. See IND. CODE § 35-27-2-1 (1971); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1510 (West Supp 1972).
quoted in Hess, 414 U.S. at 106 n.1. The Hess court wrote:
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or by
tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, quarreling, challenging to fight or
fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction, shall
be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) to which may be
added imprisonment for not to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days.
Id.
131. Hess, 414 U.S. at 106-07.
132. Id. at 107 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972)).
133. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (requiring eroticism for obscenity).
134. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
135. See id.
136. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
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attempting to regain control of the streets where approximately 100-
150 demonstrators were blocking traffic.137
Notwithstanding, the Court held that punishment was
unconstitutional since there was no evidence or rational inference
that his words were "intended to produce, and likely to produce,
imminent disorder," and thus could not be punished merely because
they tended to lead to violence. 138 This will prove to be the most
damaging language of the opinion for plaintiffs, for the court, in this
several paragraph per curiam opinion, injected an intent requirement
into the Brandenburg analysis. The Court, in other words, refined
Brandenburg's "directed to" language and created a highly speech
protective rule requiring intent. This change in the Brandenburg test
may limit a sympathetic judge's willingness to read Brandenburg
broadly in a case against a media defendant. The Hess Court,
however, did not define what level of intent was needed: whether
actual purpose, knowledge, or extreme recklessness would be
required.
(2) Lower Court Jurisprudence
In the past twenty years, media defendants have increasingly
been brought to court for allegedly causing physical injuries by the
speech they disseminated. Most of these cases were brought under a
negligence theory of tort liability, where the plaintiffs alleged that the
media works caused foreseeable harm. The courts in these cases have
denied recovery either because they found no duty139 or because they
applied the Brandenburg test, which has provided a safe harbor from
liability for media defendants. 40  Typically, under the courts'
137. Id. at 106.
138. 1d at 108-09.
139. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
defendant had no duty to investigate the accuracy of the information published in the
defendant's books); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d, 378, 381-83 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the manufacturer of D&D had no duty to warn mentally vulnerable players); Eimann
v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 834 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
defendant "owed no duty to refrain from publishing a facially innocuous classified
advertisement when the ad's context-at most-made its message ambiguous."); Zamora
v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 201-03 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding that television stations had no
duty not to produce and air violent shows); Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 167 (Fla.
1989) (holding that Pepsico had no duty to 14-year-old boy who was killed while
attempting stunt that he had seen in a commercial for defendant's product).
140. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022-25 (5th Cir. 1987); Davidson
v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ.A. CV-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *20-21 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
31, 1997); Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206; McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192-93
(Ct. App. 1988); Bill v. Superior Court for San Francisco, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627-29 (Ct.
App. 1982); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (Ct. App. 1981);
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Brandenburg application, plaintiffs have been unable to show that the
speech or expression at issue rose to the required level of incitement.
The following cases are representative of the recent media physical
injury cases and are grouped into the four following categories: (1)
Motion Picture Cases, (2) Television Broadcasting Cases, (3) Music
Cases, and (4) Literature Cases.
(a) Motion Picture Cases
In Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action against the defendant Paramount for
making and distributing the film "The Warriors.' 141  The film
portrayed the violent adventures of a fictional juvenile gang who are
chased though the subways of New York City by other youth gangs
who battled with knives, guns, and other weapons. 142 After two
youths were killed near theatres showing "The Warriors," Paramount
sent a telegram to theatres showing the film, urging them to increase
security in response to incidents of violence at theatres.1 43 Two days
later, Yakubowicz's sixteen-year-old son was knifed to death by a boy
that had just come from seeing the movie.144 Allegedly the assailant
imitated some of the scenes from the film to provoke a fight with the
decedent before killing him.145 Among Yakubowicz's various counts,
he alleged that Paramount had produced, distributed, and advertised
the film "in such a way as to induce film viewers to commit violence
in imitation of the violence in the film."'146
First, the court held that the defendant had a duty of reasonable
care to Yakubowicz's son with "respect to the producing, exhibiting,
and advertising of movies."'147 The court, however, held that the
defendant did not breach its duty because nothing in the film
constituted incitement under Brandenburg.148 The court explained
that "[a]lthough the film is rife with violent scenes, it does not at any
point exhort, urge, entreat, solicit, or overtly advocate or encourage
unlawful or violent activity on the part of viewers. 1 49 Moreover, the
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071-72 (Mass. 1989):
DeFilippo v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1040 (R.I. 1982).
141. 536 N.E.2d at 1068.
142. Id. at 1069.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1069-70.
145. Id. at 1070.
146. Id. at 1068.
147. Id. at 1070-71.
148. Id. at 1071.
149. Id.
(Vol. 52
film was not likely to incite "'imminent lawless action," ' 150 and did not
"'purport to order or command anyone to any concrete action at any
specific time, much less immediately."' 5'
(b) Television Broadcasting Cases
A nine-year-old plaintiff brought suit against NBC, seeking
damages for physical and emotional injury inflicted by three girls and
one boy who had seen a television broadcast of the made for TV
movie "Born Innocent," a film depicting the harmful effects of living
in a state-run home. 52 In one scene, a young girl is "artificially
raped" by four other girls with a tool called a "plumber's helper.' 1 53
The plaintiff was similarly "artificially raped" by the four minors with
a bottle at a San Francisco beach. 54 The assailants had allegedly seen
and discussed the scene from "Born Innocent" prior to the rape.155
Because the plaintiffs conceded that "Born Innocent" did not
"advocate or encourage violent acts" and "did not constitute
incitement," the court affirmed the district court's grant of a judgment
of nonsuit to defendant. 56 Notwithstanding, the court stated that the
television broadcast "did not fulfill the incitement requirements of
Brandenburg," but without providing any analysis or reasoning as to
why.157 The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims that the court
should apply negligence principles because the fictional presentation
of the film is distinguishable from news programs and
documentaries. 58 Finally, the court rejected extending the holdings
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,159 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 60
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the First
Amendment barred recovery where the broadcast did not constitute
an incitement to produce harmful action.' 61 On NBC's "Tonight
Show" with Johnny Carson, a professional stuntman "hung" Carson
150. Id (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969)).
151. Id. (quoting McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Ct. App. 1988)).
152. Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888,890-91 (Ct. App. 1981).
153. Id. at 891.
154. Id.
155. Id
156. Id at 892-93.
157. Id at 893.
158. See id.
159. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (imposing civil damages in favor of a private citizen who
suffered reputational harm from defamatory remarks made by the defendant).
160. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that the FCC could constitutionally restrict indecent
materials during certain times of the day).
161. DeFilippo v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1042 (R.I. 1982).
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as a stunt on the show. 162 Several hours after the broadcast, the
plaintiffs found their son hanging in front of the television.163 The
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against NBC alleging that
NBC was negligent in permitting the stunt to be broadcast, and
alternatively that NBC broadcast the stunt with intentional reckless
disregard for the welfare of the plaintiffs and their son. 164 The court
held that in a case where only one person allegedly emulated the
stunt, it could not find that the broadcast constituted incitement. 65
The court also noted that the professional stuntman warned of the
dangers and discussed the self-censorship that would result if the
court held NBC liable.166
These two cases demonstrate the high hurdle Brandenburg
presents for plaintiffs bringing actions against media defendants. The
theory underlying both cases is that a third party, or the victim,
emulated or imitated the action depicted by the media defendant. A
court is likely to view violent video games in the same light, unless the
game exhorts, urges, or directs the player to commit some activity.
(c) Music Cases
Two teen-suicide cases have been brought alleging that Ozzy
Osbourne's "Suicide Solution"-a song preaching that "suicide is the
only way out"167 incited two teenage boys to commit suicide. 168 Both
cases relied on the Brandenburg test refined in Hess, and therefore
required the plaintiff to show that the defendant directed or intended
the imminent suicide of listeners and that it was likely that the songs
would produce such a result.169 The court in Waller held that not only
was there no evidence that the music was directed toward any person
or group of persons, but there was no evidence of intent to incite
suicides. 7 0 Moreover, the court contended that the lyrics could be
perceived as "asserting in a philosophical sense that suicide may be a
viable option one should consider in certain circumstances.' 71 The
162. Id. at 1037-38.
163. Id. at 1038.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1041.
166. Id. at 1041-42.
167. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 n.5 (Ct. App. 1988).
168. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (M.D. Ga. 1991): McCollum, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
169. See Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1150-51; McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
170. See Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1151.
171. Id.
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McCollum court made similar findings. 72 Moreover, the McCollum
court argued that the lyrics could be "viewed as a poetic device, such
as a play on words, to convey meanings entirely contrary to those
asserted by plaintiffs."' 73
(d) Literature Cases
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., defendant Hustler Magazine
published an article entitled "Orgasm of Death," which described in
detail the process of autoerotic asphyxiation-hanging oneself during
masturbation in order to diminish the supply of blood to the brain
and thus heightening the physical pleasure of orgasm. 74 The heading
of the article identified it as part of a series on "discussions of 'sexual
pleasures [that] have remained hidden for too long behind the doors
of fear, ignorance, inexperience and hypocrisy."' 75 Moreover, the
article explained that the content was presented to "'increase
[readers'] sexual knowledge, to lessen [their] inhibitions and-
ultimately-to make [them] much better lover[s]." 'u 76 At least ten
warnings were located throughout the article recommending that this
method not be used unless the reader was "'anxious to wind up in
cold storage, with a coroner's tag on [his] big toe,"' and that the
article was written for educational purposes. 177
After reading the article, Troy D., a fourteen-year-old boy, hung
himself to death while attempting the practice. 178 The jury returned a
verdict under a theory of incitement in favor of Herceg for the
amount of $69,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in exemplary
damages. 79 The United States Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit
reversed the holding that the article did not rise to the level of
incitement required by Brandenburg and Hess.180  The court
explained that "no fair reading of [the article] can make its content
advocacy, let alone incitement to engage in" autoerotic
asphyxiation.' 8' Moreover, the court suggested that written materials
could never reach the requisite level of incitement because incitement
cases, including Brandenburg and Hess, typically concern "a state
172- See McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
173. Id at 193.
174. 814 F.2d 1017,1018 (5th Cir. 1987).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id- at 1018-19.
178. Id. at 1019.
179. Id
180. Id at 1023-25.
181. I& at 1023.
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effort to punish the arousal of a crowd to commit a criminal
action.1' 82  This inference, of course, could doom a plaintiff's
incitement claim brought against a video game manufacturer if
adopted by other courts. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's
attempts to distinguish Brandenburg. In reaching this conclusion, the
court stated that imposing civil liability is precluded because it might
be "'markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a
criminal statute.' ' 183 Moreover, the court rejected the proposal that
the incitement standard be relaxed because the speech at issue was of
minimal First Amendment value. 184
This precedent creates an insurmountable barrier for a plaintiff
suing a video game manufacturer since a plaintiff is unlikely to be
able to show that violent video games meet the strict Brandenburg
requirements. First, it would be nearly impossible for a plaintiff to
show that a video game manufacturer intended a child to emulate the
play of the game. Thus, so long as courts continue to read an intent
requirement into the incitement test, a plaintiff's suit will likely be
barred. Moreover, these games do not truly advocate unlawful
activity; rather, games like "Kingpin" and "Postal" merely advocate
playing the game within the confines of the game. The highest hurdle
to overcome, however, is the imminence requirement. Recall that
Hess put teeth in the imminence requirement by protecting advocacy
of illegal action at some indefinite future time. 185 Violent video
games advocate immediate action within the game, not in the outside
world. Therefore, the imminence requirement is not likely to be
satisfied. In light of Brandenburg and Hess, but especially in light of
the lower court decisions protecting media defendants by strictly
applying the Brandenburg incitement test, a plaintiff's action will
probably fail when bringing an action against a violent video game
manufacturer.
(3) Lower Courts Applying Alternative Tests: Weirum and Rice
Admittedly, several courts have abandoned the Brandenburg
incitement test. The most celebrated case is the California Supreme
Court case Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., where the court explained
that the First Amendment did not bar recovery in the Plaintiff's tort
action where it was foreseeable that the speech at issue would create
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964)).
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
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undue risk of harm.186 In Weirum, the defendant radio station, which
had a predominantly teenage audience, sponsored a promotional
contest in which a disk jockey traveled from location to location,
advising the audience of his intended destinations. 87 The first
listener to meet the disk jockey at each location would receive a
monetary prize.188 Two teenagers attempting to meet the disk jockey
forced a motorist into the center divide, resulting in the driver's
death.189 After holding that the radio station could be held liable
under California tort law, the court summarily rejected defendant's
First Amendment defense. 90 The court reasoned that "[t]he First
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely
because achieved by word, rather than act."' 91
Despite its apparent watershed status, a plaintiff suing a video
game manufacturer will not receive much benefit from relying on
Weirum. Subsequent decisions, including California Appellate courts
opinions,'92 have limited Weirum to its facts. These cases have held
that the speech at issue in Weirum either falls within the category of
commercial speech-the promotional event arguably urges a
commercial transaction-or because the level of incitement satisfies
Brandenburg, notwithstanding the fact that illegal activity was not
advocated by the radio station.193 The rationale underlying the lower
courts' distinction on commercial speech grounds is that because the
First Amendment only provides scant protection to commercial
speech, imposing civil liability would not infringe upon any First
Amendment principles.
Moreover, the level of incitement in Weirum appears sufficiently
imminent to meet the Brandenburg test: The disk jockey repeatedly
urged the teenage listeners to speed to announced locations while the
listeners were driving on the freeway. This "real time" urging,
however, is not likely to be found in a violent video game. The
plaintiff's claim in the video game case is likely to be that the player
imitated the acts that he viewed and performed in the game. While it
186. 539 P.2d 36,40 (Cal. 1975).
187. Id. at 37-38.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 38-39.
190. Id. at 40.
191. Id
192. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 196 (Ct. App. 1988); Olivia N. v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888,893-94 (Ct. App. 1981).
193. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017,1024 (5th Cir. 1987); Waller v.
Osborne, 763 F. Supp. 1144,1152 (M.D. Ga. 1991); DeFilippo v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 446
A.2d 1036,1040 (R.I. 1982).
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is true that a player must react immediately to the stimulus on the
screen, the player is only urged to react on screen, not on real streets
as in Weirum. Unlike the situation in Weirum, when a player reacts
to the urging, no one gets hurt besides an animated character in the
game. These limitations should prove fatal to plaintiffs attempting to
avoid Brandenburg by relying on Weirum.
Recently, the Fourth Circuit court of Appeals appears to have
provided a new avenue for plaintiffs bringing physical injury cases
against media defendants. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,194
defendant Paladin Enterprises published a book, Hit Man: A
Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, which gives detailed
instructions on how to murder and how to become a professional
killer.195 After reading the 130 page instructional manual, James
Perry meticulously followed the instructions and brutally murdered a
woman and her son at the request of the woman's ex-husband.196 For
example, Perry followed the instructions virtually verbatim on how to
solicit the client and avoid the FBI and other law enforcement in the
process; what to charge; where to commit the crime; the use of a
rental car; the use of a motel as a base; the use of an AR-7 rifle to kill
the victim; the practice of drilling out the serial numbers of the gun to
avoid tracing; how to make a silencer; how to murder effectively and
efficiently; how to conceal the murders; and, finally, on how to
conceal the murder by disguising the scene as a burglary and
disposing of evidence.197 Plaintiffs brought suit against Paladin for
civilly aiding and abetting in the murders. 198
After reviewing an abundance of case law imposing criminal
liability for aiding and abetting criminal acts, the court held that the
First Amendment does not bar an action for civil aider and abettor
liability.199 The court explained that "acts which the government may
criminally prosecute with little or no concern for the First
Amendment, the government may likewise subject to civil penalty or
make subject to private causes of action.' '200 However, the court
imposed two caveats to imposing aiding and abetting liability: (1) it
194. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
195. Id. at 239-41.
196. Id. at 239.
197. Id. at 239-41.
198. Id. at 241.
199. Id. at 243-44 (explaining that it is well established that speech may be proscribed or
punished if in its effect it is "tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive
conduct"-the court called this the speech-act doctrine).
200. Id. at 247.
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contended that the First Amendment may require a heightened intent
requirement in the civil context, thus precluding the imposition of
civil liability where the basis of liability is mere foreseeability or
knowledge that the information may be misused.201 The court,
however, did not have to discuss this caveat because for the purposes
of the appeal, Paladin stipulated that it "intended and had
knowledge" that "Hit Man" would be used by criminals to murder,
202
and because a reasonable jury could infer intent.20 3 Moreover,
Paladin stipulated that its marketing strategy was directed towards
"criminals and would-be criminals who desire information and
instructions on how to commit crimes." 2°4 And (2), the First
Amendment precludes imposing civil liability for speech that
constitutes pure advocacy that does not meet the Brandenburg
requirements.205 The court, however, stated that the "step-by-step
instructions for murder" were "so comprehensive and detailed" that
"Hit Man" could not be reasonably characterized as abstract
advocacy.206
Rice, like Weirum, appears to be a watershed decision: A court
held that a publisher could be held liable for the printed word that
allegedly aided and abetted the crimes of the reader. However, a
plaintiff bringing an action against a video game manufacturer still
faces formidable obstacles. First, the facts in Rice limit its potential
precedential value: the book provided detailed step-by-step
instructions for murder that Perry followed meticulously. More
damaging to a plaintiff, however, are the gross stipulations of intent
and knowledge that in effect create a hermetic barrier to liability. In
short, a plaintiff is still faced with an onerous intent requirement
established in Brandenburg and later solidified in Hess.
I1. A Ray of Hope
In the above sections, this note has argued that video games are
entitled to some level of protection under the First Amendment and
detailed the potential barriers facing a plaintiff due to lower courts
mechanically applying Brandenburg in the tort context. Therefore, if
Brandenburg were applied as it has been in the past to a video game
201. Id.
202. Id. at 248.
203. See id. at 253-55.
204. Id. at 241 n.2.
205. Id. at 248-49.
206. IL at249.
VIOLENT VIDEO GAMESNovember 2000]
manufacturer tort liability case, the case would likely be dismissed.
However, Brandenburg was not intended to apply to the tort context
and thus the lower courts have erroneously applied this highly
protective test to protect negligent media defendants. Consequently,
a court hearing a tort case against a video game manufacturer must
weigh the First Amendment interests of the video game manufacturer
against the competing interests of the injured victim, the injured
player who was induced to kill or maim, and the interests of the state
in compensating those injured as well as its interests in protecting its
children and citizens. The need for a court to strike this balance is
underscored by the recent spate of schoolyard shootings coupled with
the recent FTC report finding that video game manufacturers market
violent video games to minors.
A. Brandenburg Need Not Apply
The lower court cases discussed above mechanically applied the
Brandenburg incitement test in contexts not contemplated by the
Brandenburg court. This approach is understandable, for
Brandenburg was a per curiam opinion, suggesting that the Court was
providing a simple, uniform, and easily applicable test. However, any
well-versed First Amendment scholar that has labored through the
complicated labyrinth knows that its simplicity is illusory: Applying
Brandenburg to the physical injury context warps the case beyond
recognition.
First, a careful reading of Brandenburg reveals that the Court
protected the mere abstract teaching and mere advocacy of the moral
propriety of violence for the achievement of industrial and political
reform.20 7 The Court explicitly stated that a statute that fails to
distinguish between the "'mere abstract teaching [of] the moral
propriety"' of violence and "'preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action' is unconstitutional.2 8 Most of the current
games on the market-"Doom II," "Duke Nukem," "Postal,"
"Mortal Kombat IV"-do not advocate nor teach the abstract
teachings of the moral propriety of violence to achieve industrial and
political ends. Although violent video games are a protected form of
entertainment as discussed in Part I of this Note, the games do not
207. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (striking down statute that
forbade "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform.").
208. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1981)).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
appear to be advocating anything. Rather, they provide a player with
an arena for action and provide the artist with an arena for
expression. Admittedly, there may be games such as "Kingpin" that
involve detailed storylines that appear to be a part of a developed
plot. Such a game may indeed be advocating the use of violence to
achieve certain ends: "Everyone is familiar with instances of
propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine. '20 9 As a whole, however, games such as these do
not include the type of abstract advocacy for political and industrial
ends that implicate the strictures of Brandenburg. For example, in
"Doom Ir' and "Time Splitters," the child player walks through
rooms with an array of weapons-shotgun, tommy-gun, rocket
launcher, to name a few-with the goal of killing as many enemy
beings as necessary to advance to the next level. Further, in "Postal,"
the child player maneuvers the protagonist throughout the streets
gunning down innocent people, including unarmed women and
children. When the child player has failed to kill the victim with the
first shot, the downed victim crawls across the screen begging for
mercy. With the click of a key, the child player kills with a direct
head shot.
Second, Mr. Brandenburg was arrested and convicted for giving
a live speech to an assembled crowd.210 Thus, not only was the court
protecting live speech, but also the right to associate. Rather than
using a soapbox, the artists or the manufacturer (whoever the speaker
is) speaks vicariously through the characters and depictions on the
screen, not live to the players. Moreover, the right to associate is not
implicated in the slightest.21' Third, Mr. Brandenburg's principle
purpose in giving the speech was not to make a commercial profit, but
to achieve social and political change.212 In stark contrast, a video
game manufacturer such as Sega, id Software, or Nintendo will be
hard pressed to show that its primary purpose is not to maximize
commercial profits but rather to achieve political and industrial
change.
Fourth, the state convicted Mr. Brandenburg under its Criminal
Syndicalism statute, which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the
statute punished individuals who posed a perceived threat by their
expression-not individuals who actually caused harm. In fact, the
209. i&
210. Id. at 444-47.
211. Note, however, that in the arcade context the right to associate is a First
Amendment interest to be considered by the court.
212. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
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Supreme Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. recognized
that a substantial question exists whether a defendant could be held
liable for the harmful consequences of his speech, where the speech
did not rise to the requisite level of incitement.213 In the video game
manufacturer tort liability context, however, physical harm or death
has been sustained. Second, Brandenburg was a direct response to
the Supreme Court's long and tortured experience with the Schenck
v. United States214 and its progenies' clear and present danger test.
Although the Court cited Dennis v. United States,215 in ostensible
approval, it stated a new test that appeared to combine Judge Hand's
highly protective rule espoused in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten216
with Holmes' opinion in Schenck.217 In the civil damage context,
neither a criminal syndicalism statute nor a sedition statute is at issue.
On the contrary, the safety of the community, a person's right to
bodily integrity, a state's right to protect its citizens and provide its
citizens with a means of redress are at issue. Finally, and arguably
most important, Brandenburg did not address material targeted to
children. Violent video games, however, are targeted to minors218
and thus, as in other First Amendment contexts, require a more
relaxed level of protection. 21 9
In short, the current incitement test, like the "actual malice"
standard rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,220 fails to strike the
proper balance and thus constitutes an overprotective and
insurmountable rule. Adherence to Brandenburg virtually provides
213. 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (protesters arrested before harm ensued).
214. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
215. 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951) (applying a somewhat revised clear and present danger
test).
216. 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
217. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719. 754-55 (1975) (arguing that
the Supreme Court adopted Judge Hand's view in the first prong. and Justice Holmes'
view in the second prong).
218. See FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at iv (finding that of the 118 games with a Mature
rating for violence, 70% targeted children under seventeen and a few had marketing plans
targeting children as young as six).
219. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 635, 637-43 (1968) (employing a variable definition for obscenity, and
thus holding that children have no First Amendment right to receive pornographic
material); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (stating "[a] democratic
society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens"); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996) (plurality opinion) (upholding congressional restrictions on
cable television programming as a means of protecting children from indecency).
220. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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manufacturers with a constitutional license to negligently
manufacture and distribute games that cause foreseeable harm; in
effect, video game manufacturers are able to shift the cost of doing
business upon plaintiffs who may not have even purchased or played
the game. Moreover, such a test does not consider or weigh the
interests of the victim who has been severely harmed, the interests of
the player-child who has been induced to kill or maim, nor the
interests of the state in compensating their citizens for the harms
sustained. Applying Brandenburg in this context essentially
subsidizes the video game industry.
B. Balancing the Competing Interests and a Call for a Negligence Standard
A court rejecting Brandenburg will have to strike a new balance
in order to determine the level of protection that should apply in the
video game manufacturer tort context, for, as discussed in the above
sections, one searching through the complex maze of First
Amendment law will not find a settled norm that sufficiently applies
to this context. Thus, a court must carefully balance the First
Amendment interests of the video game manufacturers against the
interests sought to be protected by the plaintiff and the state. In
short, the determination will be whether a fault-based standard or a
higher standard such as the New York Times "actual malice"
requirement22' accommodates the competing interests.222
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., where the reconciliation of First
Amendment and tort law is most pronounced, the Supreme Court
explicitly weighed the First Amendment interests of the public in
avoiding self-censorship by the news media and in the need for a
vigorous and uninhibited press against redressing wrongful injury-
Mr. Gertz's reputation interest. The Court recognized that
absolute protection of the news media would require a "total
sacrifice" of the competing interest of the private individual's
reputational interest coupled with the state's legitimate interest in
compensating individuals for harm.224 According to the Court, "the
individual's right to the protection of his own good name 'reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
221. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964).
222. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 ("Where state laws burden the exercise of free speech, this
court has stressed that judges must attempt to reconcile the state law with competing
interests grounded in the First Amendment.").
223. 418 U.S. at 340-42.
224. IL at 341.
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every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty."'2 25
The Court held that Mr. Gertz's private reputational interest
outweighed the First Amendment interest in protecting the media
from liability and self-censorship.226 Rejecting the New York Times
actual malice standard, the Court held that so long as states "do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability.., of defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual. ' 227 In short, the Supreme Court
allows a lower culpability standard in cases of defamatory speech
against private parties.
(1) The First Amendment side of the balance
In a case involving a plaintiff suing a video game manufacturer,
the court would weigh the First Amendment interests of the video
game manufacturer to manufacture and distribute violent video
games, the public's right to receive such information, the need for
preventing self-censorship of the video game industry, and the need
for a vigorous and uninhibited exposition of ideas against the interests
sought to be protected by the plaintiff and the state. In determining
the weight to be afforded the First Amendment side of the scale, a
court should consider (1) the unique characteristics of violent video
games and (2) what impact imposing civil damages will have on the
industry.228
Even though video games are presumably a protected form of
entertainment, 229 this does not end the inquiry. Video games are also
a form of media-they serve as a conduit through which ideas and
information are disseminated to the public. The differences in the
characteristics of video games as a form of new media from
traditional forms of media may justify tipping the scale in favor of the
First Amendment or in favor of compensation.230 For example, the
225. Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion)).
226. Id. at 343-52.
227. Id. at 347.
228. This Note assumes that a test fashioned by a court hearing this matter as a matter
of first impression would limit its reach to the video game industry and to violent video
games in particular that are targeted to minors.
229. See supra Part I.B.
230. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each
medium of expression ... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards
suited to it, for each may present its own problems."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (stating that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
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First Amendment only provides the most limited protection to the
broadcast media because of several unique characteristics. First, the
number of bandwidths upon which speech may be broadcast is finite
and thus scarce. 1 As a result, the broadcast media holds a unique
position in that they have direct control over what information the
public receives. The Supreme Court, however, has explained that the
right of the public to receive information and ideas is paramount to
the First Amendment rights of the broadcast media232 Therefore, the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) may require broadcast
media to cover public issues including competing views under the
"fairness doctrine" and to provide air time to the public where a prior
broadcast involved personal attacks or political editorials.233
Second, broadcast media is afforded the "most limited"
protection because it has established a "uniquely pervasive presence
in the lives of all Americans," and third, it is "uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read.' '234 Because of the latter two
characteristics, the FCC may punish a media defendant for the
broadcast of indecent materials-materials defined as
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality"235
-over the
air waves under certain circumstances, even though such language
does not constitute obscenity or fighting words3 6
Violent video games present special and unique problems that
are more extreme than those presented by traditional forms of media,
and therefore should be entitled to the most limited protection. First,
violent video games, in general, are directed towards minors between
the ages eight and twelve.3 7 To reach this audience, manufacturers
increasingly market the most violent video games to younger
audiences. 38 In response to a request from President Clinton on June
1, 1999, and similar requests from Congress, to discover whether the
231. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 375-77.
232. Id at 388 ("Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write,
or publish."); see also id. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount.").
233. Id. at 386-401.
234. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-49 (1978).
235. Id. at 740 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966)).
236. Id. at 750 (upholding FCC's ban on the broadcast of indecent monologue during
the afternoon hours when accessibility to children was high).
237. Leslie Helm, Making A Killing; Violence Sells in Video Games, Which Is Why
Manufacturers Are Marketing Ever-Bloodier Products to Ever-Younger Audiences, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 26,1998, at D1; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at iv, 36-51.
238. See supra note 236.
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video gaming industry markets products that they know warrant
parental warnings to children, the Federal Trade Commission
recently reported that of the 118 games with a Mature rating for
violence, 70% targeted children under 17.239 In fact, 51% had at least
one marketing plan that expressly included children under 17 in their
target audience; more perverse, was the finding that a few of the
marketing plans target children as young as six. 240 For example, most
of the video game manufacturers studied intended to place ads for M-
rated241 games in magazines "which have a majority (from 54% to
68%) of readers or subscribers age 17 or under. 2 42 Thus, through an
aggressive marketing machine, video game manufacturers are able to
place these games into the hands of minors notwithstanding parental
warnings and voluntary ratings. In fact, parental warning labels are
likely to increase sales and enhance the marketing of the violent
video game because such warnings tend to "attract adolescents eager
for a look at the 'forbidden fruit.' ' 243 The most disturbing element
about the video game industry's marketing campaign is its statements
to allure buyers: "'Kill your friends guilt free,"' "'More fun than
shooting your neighbor's cat,' ..... We took what was killer, and made
it mass murder,' ..... Destroying your enemies is not enough ... you
must devour their souls,' ..... Gratuitous violence is 200 times faster
with a D-Link Network."' 244 And if these marketing statements are
not convincing, visit the "Running with Scissors" 245 web-site where
the manufacturer of "Postal" posts player reviews to market the
game. One review chosen to market the game stated the following:
"[Y]our postal games are so bad ass. I love this mindless killing....
[L]ately I've been getting sick of hearing about this Columbine High
School crap (in [C]olorado). But I think it would be so kick ass to see
a postal level having a scene similar to the [C]olumbine scene!!" 246
239. FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 45.
240. Id.
241. M-rated or Mature rated games are by definition unsuitable for persons under
seventeen. Id. at 38.
242. Id. at 47.
243. Marion D. Hefner, "Roast Pigs" and Miller-Light: Variable Obscenity in the
Nineties, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 843, 855 (1996).
244. Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, Statements before the N.Y. State Legislature, in Violent
Video Games-A Surprise or Two (Denise Breton & Christopher Largent, eds. 1999), at
http:/lwww.trufax.orglparadigmlvideo.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
245. Running with Scissors, at http://www.runningwithscissors.com/. "Running with
Scissors" is the creator of "Postal."
246. Patrick G., Player Review, Dec. 1, 1999 at http://wwwv.runningwithscissors.com
/reviews.html. This was one of many disturbing and unsettling reviews used to market
"Postal."
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Second, minors have easy access to violent video games. One
reason is that graphics-intensive games like "Doom II," "Postal," and
"Kingpin" are now more affordable to minors.247 Moreover, retailers
as a whole do not impose restrictions on who can purchase games
despite parental warnings; thus, the FTC found that "children under
17 can easily buy M-rated games." 248  Indeed, "[u]naccompanied
children ages 13-16 were able to purchase these games at 85% of the
380 stores visited."249 Further, in the age of unmonitored internet
sales, minors may easily access the video game market by
downloading games without parental supervision.250 In addition, with
the proliferation of video games, minors may find access by being
introduced and playing such games at other children's houses.
Because of the magnitude of accessibility, video games, like broadcast
media, have become pervasive in American lives. Both of these
elements-the predominantly adolescent audience and the
accessibility to minors -are critical in the analysis because of society's
compelling interest to protect the psychological and physical "well-
being of its youth."'251
Third, as in the broadcast context, "prior warnings cannot
completely protect" the player from the unexpected graphic content
of the video game.252 Thus, unwitting minors are exposed to extreme
depictions of graphic violence repeatedly without adequate
warnings2 3 For instance, when one starts the game "Postal," the
player is confronted with a scene of a man holding a shotgun in his
yard. The player maneuvers the protagonist outside of his yard where
he proceeds to gun down innocent individuals: police officers, little
247. See Helm, supra note 237, at D1 (stating that game prices have plunged to a level
within the budgets of most teenagers). The author, in fact, only paid $7.95 for "Postal" on-
line.
248. FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 52.
249. Id.
250. See id. Despite retail bans of "Postal," 100,000 copies of "Postal" were sold from
their website. Multimedia Notes, 7 CONSUMER MULTIMEDIA REP., Mar. 23, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 11069150. Consider the following anecdote: On January 6, 2000, I
went online to the Yahoo website. I searched for "violent video games" and found the
ultra-graphic, ultra-violent game "Postal." I then placed the game in my shopping cart and
used my wife's credit card to buy the game. The website never asked me for information
to ensure that I was not a minor or to determine my identity. When I received the game,
the packaging lacked any parental warnings concerning the content of the game even
though the game is not sold in stores because of its graphic nature.
251. See supra note 218.
252- Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748.
253. Id. at 748-49 (stating that "To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off
the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is
to run away after the first blow.").
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children, and unarmed men and women. Blood splatters across the
screen as the people are shot. No one can prepare the player for the
horrible screams, moans, and indignity. Victims, in fact, who were
not "fortunate" enough to be killed on the first hit, slowly crawl
across the ground begging to be put to death. The player can then
move in close and shoot the begging victim at close range in the head
to put the victim out of her misery. The most disturbing scene in
"Postal," aside from the massacring of children who are merely
walking by, is where the player hits a button and, as a result, the
protagonist turns the gun on himself, states "I regret nothing," and
pulls the trigger, after which his brains are spread across the screen.
Fourth, and most alarming, violent video games potentially
teach, train, and instruct minors in the art of killing.254 At the outset,
it should be recognized that the American Medical Association
(AMA), the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), the American Academy of
Mental Health (AAMH), and the Surgeon General have all made
definitive statements that violent video games are harmful to
minors.25 Studies have shown that viewers of violent video media
''acquire new means of harming others not previously present" in
their prior behavior and become increasingly desensitized to violence
and thus "show little, if any, emotional arousal in response to such
stimuli" as their "inhibitions against aggressive behavior are
weakened. ' '256 Violent video games go beyond this. Unlike motion
pictures or television, entertainment that involves passive
254. See GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 80, at 65-81; Debra Buchman &
Jeanne Funk, Video and Computer Games in the 90's, 24 CHILDREN TODAY, AT 12
(Summer-Fall 1996) (claiming that "Violence is primarily a learned behavior, [and] the
powerful combination of demonstration, reward, and practice, inherent in electronic game
playing creates an ideal instructional environment.").
255. Grossman, supra note 244.
256. COMM'N ON VIOLENCE & YOUTH, AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS'N, PSYCHOLOGY
RESPONSE 33 (2000) (stating that "There is absolutely no doubt that higher levels of
viewing violence on television are correlated with increased acceptance of aggressive
attitudes and increased aggressive behavior."); THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON
TELEVISION AND SOC. BEHAVIOR, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT: TELEVISION AND
GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE 122-25 (1972) (providing
empirical data showing that children often mimic violence portrayed on television);
HAROLD 1. KAPLAN, M.D. ET AL., KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY
175 (7th ed. 1994); Benjamin Spock, M.D., How On-Screen Violence Hurts Your Kids,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1987, at 26 (explaining that children who see violence regularly accept it
as standard human behavior); see also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-43 (noting that the fact
that a causal link between children viewing pornography and children acting out
pornographic scenes had not been disproved was sufficient reason to uphold a New York
statute which criminalized the sale of pornographic magazines to minors).
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participation where the receiver of the information merely views the
violent depictions, violent video games involve an interactive
experience: the player, often an unwitting child, pulls the trigger,
inflicts the harm, and moves in for the kill. The games use real video
clips, richly detailed animation, and stereo sound effects to simulate
real-world environments. The minor is placed in a virtual reality-in
a three-dimensional field of experience. This allows players to sense
and manipulate virtual stimuli as they would in the real world, thus
providing them with a feeling of being completely immersed in the
simulated world.
Moreover, this interactive process may teach and condition
players to kill through a process known as operant conditioning.257
The player is presented repeatedly with substantially the same stimuli
and circumstances to elicit a certain response. The player's behavior
is then reinforced by rewarding that behavior, through points and
level advancement. As a result, when confronted with similar
circumstances, the player "reacts from a conditioned response rather
than making a cerebral decision. ' '258 We are all familiar with this type
of instruction: small children are taught by "Smokey the Bear" to
stop, drop, and roll; football coaches have their players hit a pad at
the same angle at each blow of the whistle; airline pilots are put in
simulators and are confronted with the same stimulus requiring the
same response; and soldiers are taught to aim, shoot, and fire without
contemplating. This mode of instruction is so effective that violent
video games are used as "killing simulators" to teach and condition
marines and police officers to kilL259 The game ensures that marines
and officers will not freeze when confronted with certain situations,
and will, rather, react immediately with their weapons.2 60 Thus, the
player does not learn how to resolve conflicts through compromise,
negotiation, or more speech, but is conditioned to react with force
and violence. Even though some games may be played with a
keyboard such as "Postal," the space bar is still an efficient combat
simulator; for example, marines use a modified version of Doom
called "Marine Doom" to teach new recruits how to kill. In "Marine
Doom," the players use the button on the mouse to kill rather than a
plastic gun.261 The games available to the domestic population are
257. See GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 80, at 73; see also KAPLAN ET AL.,
supra note 256, at 166.
258. GROSSMAN & DEGAETANo, supra note 80, at 73.
259. Id
260. See id at 73-74.
261. See id at 77.
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seemingly indistinct from the ones used by the armed forces. For
example, the United States Army uses a device known as the
Multipurpose Arcade Combat Simulator (MACS) for extensive
marksmanship training.262  The MACS is a converted Super
Nintendo, replacing the plastic gun with a plastic M-16.2 63 One need
only walk through the local arcade to witness the disturbing realistic
detail of the artificial weapons being used by children to kill on
screen. Moreover, in "Kingpin: Life of Crime," the animated figures
are separated into fifteen body parts, requiring the player to be more
accurate since the areas of target are smaller. Of course, the player is
still rewarded with more points for head shots and blowing off a limb.
In addition, the player is able to see how injured the victim is by
distinguishing between a victim who is merely bleeding from one who
has a cracked skull.
Furthermore, violent video games may be addictive. 264 Some
have argued that video games are so addictive to young people that
they may be socially isolating.265  Children play these games
obsessively, day after day, without interruption.266 Finally, video
games, while serving several First Amendment functions, arguably do
not hold as high of a position as does the press, at issue in New York
Times267 and Gertz, 68 or the political speech in Brandenburg. In
other words, a court should consider the fact that the primary
function of video games is recreation when determining the weight to
be given the First Amendment side of the balance. In short, violent
video games should be afforded limited protection because they are
directed to children; children have unique access to them; warnings
are insufficient protections; the primary function of video games is
recreation; and violent video games are potential "killing simulators"
in the hands of impressionable children and thus might train and
condition minors to react with force and violence rather than with
negotiation and compromise.
However, in weighing the First Amendment interests, a court
must consider the chilling effect that imposing civil damages will have
262. See Grossman, supra note 244.
263. See id.
264. See JANE M. HEALEY, PH.D., ENDANGERED MINDS: WHY KIDS DON'T THINK
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1991), for a comprehensive discussion about why video
games are addictive.
265. See P. Zimbardo, Understanding Psychological Man, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May
1982, at 58-59.
266. See GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 80, at 68.
267. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
268. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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upon the violent video game industry in manufacturing games that
fall outside of this category. The effect should be minimal.
Compensatory damages in this context are mere economic
externalities that would be internalized by the video game
manufacturers as a commercial cost of doing business. Imposing
damages would thus guarantee that those who profit from the
commercial transaction-video game manufacturers and the
consumers who buy the games-bear the cost of that transaction-the
civil liability due to the distribution of the game. However, in light of
video game sales in this country,269 if no limits were placed upon
which plaintiffs could sue and against whom they could sue, there
could be a drastic chilling effect due to a considerably large class of
potential plaintiffs, but, as discussed below, a fault standard should
dispel such fears.
(2) The plaintiffs side of the balance
On the other side of the balance are the substantial social costs
exacted by protecting the distribution of such products. First, the
victim has compelling bodily integrity and emotional interests: The
victim has either sustained horrible physical injury or, as in the
Carneal case, has died. Second, the court must weigh in the
psychological well-being of the player-child who has been induced to
kill or maim.270 And finally, the state's interest in compensating the
injured plaintiff271 and in protecting its citizens and its children must
be considered.2 72 These interests clearly outweigh the moral interests
which the Court held trumped the First Amendment values in
distributing obscene materials in Miller. Consider the scenario where
obscene material is placed in a video game targeted to children. In
such a case, the First Amendment would not bar legislatures from
prohibiting the distribution because of the potential harmful effects
that the obscene material will have on the child players. It is hard to
269. See Shapely, supra note 80 (stating that there are twenty-seven million casual
garners in the country); 1999 Year in Review: Video Game Violence Back in the Spotlight,
MULTIMEDIA WIRE, Dec. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6703643 (stating that gaming
industry closing in on the $7 billion mark); GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 80, at
65-66 (discussing the pervasiveness of video games and stating that video game sales in the
U.S. exceed $10 billion annually).
270. The Court has traditionally applied different First Amendment principles and, in
fact, less protection when children are at issue. See supra note 218.
271. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
272. The interest in protecting children is also at issue because a state has a compelling
interest in preventing the development of killing automatons. Recall that for purposes of
this Note, it is presumed that all of the tort elements have been established, including
actual and proximate causation.
November 2000]
imagine a rationale that bars this type of video game distribution but
allows the distribution of games that are filled with extreme violence
that actually and proximately caused physical injury. These interests
also clearly outweigh the reputational interests at issue in Gertz which
were protected by the Court at the expense of the First Amendment.
Some critics may argue that Gertz is a defamation case and thus
should not apply to this context. First, the balancing test used in
Gertz is not unique to defamation, but rather underlies all of the First
Amendment cases: the Court, in developing rules and principles,
balances the First Amendment values against the societal costs of
protecting those values.273 Second, violent video games are directed
at children and thus should be entitled to less protection than those
targeted to adults. Finally, it would be hardly defensible and nearly
impossible to reconcile a contrary outcome. Once one juxtaposes
Gertz with the dicta in James, the perversity becomes disturbingly
apparent. On the one hand, a private citizen who suffers reputational
harms is entitled to his day in court. At the same time, a victim who
has sustained severe physical injury or even death, as in James, has
her case dismissed out of hand. The First Amendment should not be
a constitutional straightjacket, paralyzing individuals from realizing
their civil liberties in favor of those who have intruded upon those
liberties.
Therefore, a court carefully balancing the competing interests
should conclude that a fault standard similar to that recognized in
Gertz applies in the video game manufacturer tort liability context.
Applying a negligence standard produces an equitable boundary
between the First Amendment interests and the countervailing
concerns. Such a rule gives the manufacturer no more than a
responsible citizen is entitled, gives the individual victim no more
than what he is entitled to-actual damages-and at the same time
maintains judicial integrity. Unlike mechanically applying the
Brandenburg incitement test, the proposed standard recognizes the
273. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (balancing the First Amendment
interests against the state's interests in protecting the well-being of its children and holding
that the state could prohibit the distribution of child pornography); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (balancing the First Amendment interests against the social costs of
viewing obscene materials and thus creating the three-pronged obscenity test):
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (balancing the First Amendment
interests in free speech against the societal interests in preventing potential harm and thus
establishing the incitement test). Cases such as Brandenburg have created categorical
rules that are a product of carefully balancing the values of protecting speech against the
conflicting societal values of preventing threatened or actual harm associated with such
speech.
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compelling interest of the plaintiff who has suffered physical injury
and the state's legitimate interest in providing compensation and
protecting its citizens. Moreover, a negligence standard will insulate
the court from becoming partners in corporate malfeasance: these
corporations should not profit from lawless behavior, nor should the
court place its imprimatur on such profits.
At the same time, the video game manufacturers are provided
with sufficient First Amendment protection. First, a plaintiff may not
bring a case based upon strict products liability. Rather, under a
negligence theory, the video game manufacturer must be at fault: A
plaintiff will be required to show that the video game manufacturer
caused foreseeable harm by negligently manufacturing and
distributing a violent video game that was the actual and proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The James case is instructive. In
dismissing the plaintiff's negligence claims, Judge Johnstone first held
that the video game manufacturers did not have a legal duty because
it is "clearly unreasonable to expect Defendants to have foreseen
Plaintiffs' injuries from Michael Cameal's actions."274 Relying on the
Sixth Circuit rationale in Watters,275 he explained that the defendants
could not be expected to ascertain the mental state of every potential
player.276 Second, Judge Johnstone held that as a matter of law
Michael Carneal's actions were a sufficient "superceding cause," thus
breaking the causal link. He explained that Michael Carneal's acts
were so "'highly extraordinary in nature' and 'unforeseeable in
character,' that they operate to 'relieve [Defendants] of liability.' ' '277
In sum, traditional common law tort principles will bar most actions
against a video game manufacturer defendant and thus will
sufficiently protect their First Amendment interests; however, once a
prima facie tort case is established, the First Amendment should not
bar such a claim to proceed.
Conclusion
A plaintiff suing a video game manufacturer for negligently
producing and distributing a violent video game that caused
foreseeable harm to the plaintiff is faced with several obstacles. First,
the plaintiff will have to show that the video game manufacturer was
274. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798,803 (W.D. Ky. 2000)..
275. Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378,382 (6th Cir. 1990).
276. James, 90 F. Supp. at 804.
277. Id. at 808 (quoting Montgomery Elevator v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776, 780
(Ken. 1984)).
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negligent: it created an undue risk of harm by distributing a violent
video game that caused actual and foreseeable harm to the plaintiff.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a plaintiff, however, is the First
Amendment. Admittedly, the classic First Amendment rationales
offered by John Stewart Mill, Judge Learned Hand, Justice Oliver W.
Holmes, and Justice William Brandeis-those who believed that
freedom of speech was indispensable to the search for truth, a well
informed electorate, and an ordered society278-do not appear to
apply to violent video games. However, with the complex plots, rich
animation, and virtual stimuli represented in the violent video games
of today, coupled with First Amendment values revealed in this Note,
a court is likely to find that violent video games are entitled to some
level of protection.
The plaintiffs will also have to contend with the Brandenburg
incitement test and the lower courts that have mechanically applied
that test in cases involving media defendants. Brandenburg
administers an extremely high barrier to self-censorship of media and
it correspondingly exacts a high price from the victims of physical
injury. Admittedly, the preservation of First Amendment principles
demands patience on the part of those who might like to see the
manufacturers held accountable. Thus, this is a time for judicial
restraint in order not to provide a knee-jerk reaction that would likely
produce an unprincipled decision. This Note, however, provides an
analytical framework resulting in a principled decision that will
sufficiently protect the First Amendment interests at stake while at
the same time accommodate the competing interests of the victims
and of the state.
Therefore, this Note proposes disposing with the mechanical and
erroneous application of Brandenburg and insists that a court permit
a negligence theory to proceed. Such a standard strikes the proper
balance between the First Amendment interests in preventing the
self-censorship of the violent video gaming industry and the plaintiffs
bodily integrity interests, the psychological well-being of the player-
child, and the state's interest in compensating individuals who suffer
harm. The goal of this Note, however, is neither to advocate nor
encourage potential plaintiffs to bring suits against video game
manufacturers for manufacturing and distributing violent video
games; rather, this Note contends that the First Amendment does not
preclude such an action. An injured plaintiff should be compensated
278. See Harry Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1,
15-16 (1960).
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for the video game industry's unreasonable behavior that caused the
plaintiff's harm: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury";279 the First Amendment should not
be a license for unreasonable behavior, whoever the actor.
279. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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